Discovering Work: A Topical Introduction by González-Martínez, Esther et al.
Ethnographic Studies, No 12, December 2011 
1 
 
Discovering Work: A Topical Introduction 
 
Philippe Sormani  Esther González-Martínez  Alain Bovet 
          University of Lucerne      University of Fribourg  EHESS, Paris 
(philippe.sormani@unilu.ch) (esther.gonzalezmartinez@unifr.ch) (alain.bovet@unifr.ch) 
 
 
“discover ... v. 1. To arrive at through 
search or study. 2. To be the first to find, 
learn of, or observe. < LLat. discooperire, to 
reveal” (American Heritage Dictionary, p. 
203) 
 
This special issue of Ethnographic Studies 
offers a collection of ethnomethodological 
studies of practical investigations in the 
natural sciences, mathematics and related 
domains (e.g., surgery). The leitmotiv of 
the collection – “discovering work” – hints 
at both its outlook and topic.  
 
On the one hand, the collection brings 
together descriptive studies of practical 
activities in the domains mentioned above, 
studies that teach the reader those domains 
“from within”, so that s/he may (re-) 
discover their constitutive activities in their 
phenomenal detail – be it in tutorial 
situations, expert practice or hybrid 
settings. On the other hand, the collection 
offers the reader a distinctive reminder of 
“discovering work” as an ordinary feature 
of both science instruction and research 
practice – that is, their directed character, 
to expose or find something new (at least 
to the involved student or practitioner) – 
instead of dismissing that feature on 
philosophical or sociological grounds (e.g., 
from a skepticist stance, as integral to 
many constructivist approaches).  
 
To meet that double objective, the 
collection favors descriptive, video- and/or 
practice-based approaches, as well as 
detailed investigation into the close, yet 
curiously neglected ties between action and 
instruction, practice and pedagogy.  
 
“Discovering work”, then, stands as an 
introductory gloss for the instructive and 
methodical work that it takes to have any 
discovery recognizably obtained and 
exhibited, in and as part of a distinctive 
practice and manifest discipline. The gloss 
encapsulates the heuristic orientation of 
disciplinary inquiry, devoted to “making 
discoveries”, if not in the second then at 
least in the first of the two senses quoted in 
the epigraph.
1
 
 
The remainder of this introduction is meant 
to be “topical” in a double sense. First, the 
very topic of discovery is introduced, as a 
classic topic in social studies of science, 
yet re-specified by ethnomethodological 
inquiry. Second, the point and purpose for 
taking up that topic at all and re-specifying 
it here and now, in this special issue, is 
elaborated upon, especially with respect to 
the current mainstream in science and 
technology studies (STS). Finally, the 
collected studies are briefly presented. 
 
From discovery to discovering work: 
Re-specifying a classic topic 
 
As M. Lynch points out in his contribution 
to this special issue,  
 
“Discovery is one of the most persistent 
and alluring topics in philosophy, history, 
and social studies of science, and yet 
there is surprisingly little work that 
directly addresses discovering work.” 
(Lynch, this issue, p. 79; emphasis added)  
 
                                                          
1
 H. Garfinkel examined this heuristic orientation as 
a routine feature of the natural sciences in everyday 
practice – that is, their ordinary, if not intended lack 
of “foregone conclusions” (Garfinkel, 2002).  
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Lynch’s remark echoes a related, much 
earlier comment by A. Kaplan:  
 
“Because our reconstructions have 
occupied themselves with justifications, 
we have concluded that there is no logic-
in-use in making discoveries.” (Kaplan, 
1967:14) 
 
The point of recalling Kaplan’s comment 
is to hint at the intellectual tradition that 
runs across philosophy in epistemological 
mode and social studies of science. 
Although Kaplan’s comment bore mainly 
on the philosophical reconstruction of 
research practices, it applies to the 
sociological reconstruction of the resulting 
sciences and their technical contents as 
well.
2
  
 
Indeed, the “sociology of scientific 
knowledge” (SSK) envisaged a social 
explanation for the justification, 
acceptance or refusal of knowledge claims, 
under causalist rather than rationalist 
auspices, where it had been previously 
sought of “false beliefs” only, if at all (e.g., 
Bloor, 1991, 2004; Shapin, 1996). This 
bold move, now largely taken for granted, 
proved consequential in many respects. 
One consequence was, and remains, that it 
prevented SSK from pursuing descriptive 
inquiry into “science as a practice” 
(Pickering, 1992:1-8). In particular, the 
“lived work” at figuring out warrantable 
claims, conducting probative experiments 
or triggering novel findings, under the 
chosen auspices, tended to escape its 
empirical attention and analytic focus 
(ibid., pp. 5-6). The same holds for later 
attempts at quasi “techno-anthropological” 
explanation, as promoted by B. Latour 
                                                          
2
 The “knowledge/belief trick” (J. Lee, personal 
communication), where positive knowledge is 
defined as “accepted belief”, does not undermine 
the mentioned continuity but elaborates and 
presupposes it. The trick has recently been (re-) 
performed as a “validity/credibility” swap (see 
Shapin, 2010a).    
against and yet in the vein of SSK (see 
Quéré, 1989).  
 
As D. Bloor acknowledged in a recent 
entry to a philosophy dictionary,   
 
“Sociologists have little to offer on the 
origin of ideas [e.g., the logic-in-use in 
making discoveries], but much to say 
about their evaluation and subsequent 
elaboration.” (Bloor, 1998) 
 
Ethnomethodological inquiry, to cut a long 
story short, doesn’t suggest separating the 
“origin of ideas” from their “evaluation 
and subsequent elaboration,” as D. Bloor’s 
formulation does. Indeed, such inquiry 
rejects the analytic separation of mental 
predicates (expressing an “intention,” 
“knowledge,” “belief” or “doubt”) from 
the practices that enact, instantiate or 
otherwise relate to them (Watson and 
Coulter, 2008:11-13). Positively put, 
ethnomethodological inquiry aims at 
making explicit the “genealogical 
relationship between social practices and 
accounts of those practices” (Lynch, 
1993:1) – be it in terms of mental, 
epistemological or other predicates. As it 
happens, a key study that examined the 
mentioned relationship in perspicuous 
detail was devoted to discovering work: 
the seminal paper by H. Garfinkel and his 
colleagues describing an “optically 
discovered pulsar” as an astronomically 
accountable object (more of which 
below).
3
 
 
Most laboratory and controversy studies 
were devised in the vein of SSK however, 
not so much for the sake of empirical 
                                                          
3
 The key transition has been characterized as 
follows: “rather than trying to explain a practice in 
terms of underlying dispositions, abstract norms, or 
interests, a task for sociology would be to describe 
the ensemble of actions that constitute the practice. 
This is precisely what ethnomethodology seeks to 
do.” (Lynch, 1992:290; emphasis added) More 
recently, see also Doing (2009:34).  
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investigation, ethnographic description or 
social explanation alone (as if that 
restriction would have constituted a 
“failure of nerve”, Hess, 2001:242), but to 
dismiss arguably prevalent views on 
science and technology (“naïve realism,” 
“critical rationalism,” “depoliticized 
objectivism,” etc.) or, at least, to contribute 
to the discussion of such views through an 
“analytic critique of science” (Collins, 
1996:240-41).
4
  
 
This critical thrust – facilitated by the 
“practice/predicate” disjunction as well as 
the “knowledge/belief” trick – appears 
particularly prominent when it comes to 
the topic of discovery and discovering 
work.  
 
To begin with, the “mentalistic model of 
discovery,” where outstanding individuals 
are naïvely credited momentous 
achievements, was to be discarded and 
substituted by an “attributional model,” 
where the “status as discovery” is 
redefined and re-explained, retrospectively, 
as a “function of perception by the 
community” (Brannigan, 1980:565, 
1981:71). In the same vein, the common 
idea that “science works at discovering 
preexisting reality” would have to be 
replaced, once it had been disclosed as a 
popular myth, by the opposite idea 
according to which “representation 
rationalizes and thus constitutes scientific 
objects post hoc” (see Woolgar, 1988:55-
66). More recently, B. Latour has made a 
moral appeal: any description of “matters 
of fact,” whether constructivist or not, 
should be located in a discussion of 
“matters of concern,” his concern of the 
day being (quasi-)constructivist denials of 
climate change and its human origin 
(Latour, 2004).
5
  
                                                          
4
 On the philosophical agenda of SSK, see 
Friedman (1998); Shapin (1996:296-297).  
5
 His cosmopolitan lamentation, rightly or wrongly, 
elaborates the following question: “While we spent 
years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden 
As the sampled moves suggest, an 
argumentative stance is cultivated with 
respect to social epistemology, rather than 
a descriptive interest in discovering work.  
 
To refocus on description as the prime 
methodological objective means - at least 
for a start - to abandon the critical task of 
adjudicating between different models and 
modes of reasoning. Ethnomethodological 
inquiry, in particular, abandons the 
misleading competition with presumed 
“common sense” in favor of the descriptive 
analysis of practical action and practical 
reasoning (Hester and Francis, 2007). For 
the detailed study of discovering work, this 
means inter alia to disentangle 
investigative relevancies, as encountered in 
research practice at the worksite, from their 
conflation with (putatively) dubious 
philosophy of science, as imputed and 
dismissed ex officio or ex cathedra. 
Discovering work, then, is and can be 
studied as a practical achievement through 
and through – that is, an observable 
achievement “without residue” (R. 
Watson, personal communication), 
including its sometimes arguable 
character.
6
  
 
To return to the practical achievement, in 
Garfinkel’s (1991) terminology, means to 
“re-specify” the topic of discovery, as 
formulated in the sociological or any other 
literature, and that by focusing upon its 
relevance in-and-to the research practices 
under scrutiny (at the lab bench or surgery 
table, in front of the computer screen, etc.). 
The topic focused upon, by consequence, 
                                                                                    
behind the appearance of objective statements, do 
we now have to reveal the real objective and 
incontrovertible facts hidden behind the illusion of 
prejudices?” (Latour, 2004:227) 
6
 Research practice might not fit any philosophical 
ideal of (say) disembodiment, determination or 
disinterestedness. Yet to conclude, if ironically, 
from this lack of fit that research practice is “never 
pure” witnesses lacking disentanglement yet again, 
respectively sustained conflation of analysts’ and 
practitioners’ perspectives (e.g., Shapin, 2010b).  
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is not restricted to “groundbreaking 
discoveries”, around and through which 
history of science is made and unmade 
(starting with the “anomalies” of interest to 
Kuhn, 1962). Neither is it restricted to the 
selective media coverage of reportedly 
extraordinary events. To the contrary, 
discovering work is examined as a 
constitutive and pervasive feature of the 
natural sciences in their mundane routine
7
. 
 
A rationale for re-specification:  
Science and technology studies today 
 
In 1981, H. Garfinkel and his colleagues 
published the paper titled “The Work of a 
Discovering Science Construed with 
Materials from the Optically Discovered 
Pulsar” (Garfinkel et al., 1981). The key 
point of the paper was to highlight the 
intertwined character of the locally enacted 
inquiry and its progressively discovered 
phenomenon. The decisive move, then, 
was not to draw an ironic contrast between 
research practice and scientific discourse, 
but to recover the former as a uniquely 
achieved, yet indispensable basis for the 
latter, in and for the examined case of 
astronomical observation. This unique 
achievement was described in its “first 
time through” properties, with the 
observational “runs” leading to the 
emerging phenomenon, the “optically 
discovered pulsar,” and vice-versa. The apt 
analogy of a “potter’s object” emphasized 
this mutual elaboration in its temporal 
course, practical enactment and 
instrumental adjustments, thus resulting in 
an “occasioned production” (Koschmann 
and Zemel, 2009).       
 
This special issue returns to discovering 
work, qua practical achievement in situ 
                                                          
7
 “Mundane” doesn’t mean trivial (e.g., Sintonen 
and Kiikeri, 2004:241). Otherwise, scientific 
training, as examined in some papers of this special 
issue, would be pointless: “[research] ‘practices,’ 
after all, must be practiced.” (Mody and Kaiser, 
2008:383) 
and in vivo, as highlighted in the “pulsar 
paper,” including a first appreciation of its 
current reception, thirty years on (see 
Bovet et al., this issue).  
 
Our principal reason for returning to that 
topic, thirty years on, is the ironic gap 
between programmatically repeated calls 
for a “practice turn” in science and 
technology studies (STS) (e.g., Lynch, 
1993; Pickering, 1992; Schatzki et al., 
2001) and the relative scarcity of 
effectively practice-investigating studies in 
the field, devoted to answering the 
(seemingly) prosaic question: “what are 
they doing?” (Sharrock and Button, 
2011:225). There remains, indeed, a 
manifest scarcity of descriptive studies that 
answer that question stringently, 
informatively, and sociologically – that is, 
by having it addressed as just how 
whatever “they” (this or that local staff of 
lab members) seem to be doing can be seen 
for what “it” is to them (this or that 
intricate task and social phenomenon)? 
Ethnomethodology at work, arguably, has 
proven the most apposite and productive in 
tackling the raised question (e.g., Lynch et 
al., 1983; Lynch and Sharrock, 2003; 
Rouncefield and Tolmie, 2011). Yet it 
remains or has become largely absent from 
STS.
8
 
  
If it were all “gloom and doom”, this 
special issue couldn’t have been 
assembled, however. Our aim as editors, at 
least, was not to indulge in misplaced 
nostalgia but to gather recent studies in 
ethnomethodological perspective and to 
reflect upon their possible relationship(s) 
to STS at large (for a related initiative, see 
Lynch, 2011b). Therefore, we have 
assembled concrete exemplars of both 
                                                          
8
 As M. Lynch concedes, “judging from 
submissions to this journal [Social Studies of 
Science] and the programs at recent Society for 
Social Studies of Science (4S) meetings, 
ethnomethodology is not much in evidence.” 
(Lynch, 2011a:2) 
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practice-based studies of domain-specific 
skills, as recently advocated by E. 
Livingston (2008), and video-based studies 
of practical activities in the natural 
sciences, as honed by several analysts, 
often at the Ethnomethodology/STS 
interface (see, among others, Alač, 2011; 
Greiffenhagen and Sharrock 2011; 
Mondada, 2005). 
 
The ensuing collection contains selected 
ethnomethodological studies that run 
against the grain of mainstream STS. The 
collection, we hope, should thus contribute 
to renewed discussion (see below). In the 
meantime, we may sketch the key 
tendencies in current STS that, in our view, 
contribute to move the field away from 
detailed investigations of research 
practices, potentiating thus a “practice U-
turn”. These tendencies may be listed as 
follows:  
 
 First, the manifest abandonment of lab 
ethnography and its descriptive interest 
in “research in the making” at the 
worksite, as if lab work had been 
conclusively described (e.g., Doing 
2008:291-292);  
 Second, the promotion of theoretical 
frameworks to re-present social and 
institutional configurations, 
incapacitating one’s “seeing things for 
themselves” (Hutchinson et al., 2008);9 
 Third, the virtually unbounded 
multiplication of topical fields 
(including governance, finance, etc.), at 
the seeming expense of any sustained 
focus on constitutive practices.
10
    
 
As unwarranted and precipitated as the 
retreat from lab ethnography and the 
related compulsions to “theorize politics” 
and “multiply topics” may have been, all 
of them have caught on and set the STS 
                                                          
9
 Actor-Network Theory constitutes, arguably, the 
paradigmatic case of this tendency.  
10
 For an uncompromising critique of this tendency 
in British sociology, see Watson (2000).  
agenda up to the present day, as the 
introduction to the current Handbook of 
Science and Technology Studies suggests.  
 
After having spelled out the purpose of the 
Handbook
11
, its editors comment upon the 
received contributions: 
 
“What emerged [from those 
contributions] is a multifaceted interest in 
the changing practices of knowledge 
production, concern with connections 
among science, technology, and various 
social institutions (the state, medicine, 
law, industry, and economics more 
generally), and urgent attention to issues 
of public participation, power, 
democracy, governance, and the 
evaluation of scientific knowledge. 
 
These topics are approached with 
theoretical eclecticism: rather than 
defending pure positions, authors risked 
strategic crossovers and melded ideas 
from different intellectual domains. 
Normativity, relativism, and evaluation of 
expertise and scientific knowledge endure 
from previous volumes but in new ways: 
no longer just problems for philosophical 
reflection, such concerns are now posed 
in terms that seek collective political and 
social resolution.” (Hackett et al., 2008:3; 
emphasis added)  
 
Thus the current mainstream in STS, at 
least in the light of this overview, takes for 
granted three things. First, its “multifaceted 
interest” in the “changing practices of 
knowledge production” (and so on) 
assumes those practices to be readily and 
interestingly identifiable, without the 
awkward detour of descriptive analysis. 
The focus on their “change,” 
institutionalized “connections” and 
associated “issues” presupposes the 
                                                          
11
 “[…] a handbook that would consolidate the 
field’s accomplishments, welcome new scholars to 
enter STS, and indicate promising research 
pathways into the future.” (Hackett et al., 2008:3) 
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problem of initial practice description to be 
solved by itself (to the satisfaction of the 
highlighted focus at least). Second, 
“theoretical eclecticism” is assumed to 
offer the most accurate appreciation, not so 
much of distinctive research practices 
(their understanding being already taken 
for granted), but of the various topics in 
terms of which those practices should be 
triangulated and reinterpreted 
(“normativity,” “relativism,” “evaluation 
of expertise,” etc.). Third, “collective 
political and social resolution” is inscribed 
as an indispensable topic, if not a practical 
task of STS scholarship, despite (or 
because of?) its “multi-theoretical” bent.12  
 
None of the three assumptions is gladly 
shared by ethnomethodological inquiry. To 
the contrary, such inquiry, at least when 
understood as an autonomous endeavor 
(Sharrock and Watson, 1988), may be said, 
and seen, to derive its rationale for re-
specification from a manifest and sustained 
lack of agreement. The principal aim of 
this special issue, however, is not to take a 
critical stance but, rather, to assemble an 
interesting array of case studies. These are 
briefly presented in the next section.
13
 
 
Varieties, ambivalences and con- 
sequences of re-specification:  
The studies in this special issue 
 
The idea for collecting the ensuing studies 
in a special issue such as this goes back to 
a workshop titled Scientific Practice as 
Ordinary Action, held at the University of 
Fribourg, Switzerland, in March 2007. The 
aim of the workshop was to bring together 
current ethnographies of lab work, devised 
in ethnomethodological or related 
                                                          
12
 “Reflexive” and “deconstructive” initiatives, in 
turn, seem to have curiously vanished (e.g., 
Ashmore, 1989; Merz and Knorr Cetina, 1997).   
13
 For an initial ethnomethodological critique of 
constructivist re-descriptions of discovering work 
and S. Woolgar’s “policy of inversion” in 
particular, see Button and Sharrock (1993).  
perspectives. As the title of the workshop 
suggests, M. Lynch’s seminal book 
provided a key inspiration, especially its 
invitation to proceed with “epistopical re-
specification,” understood as an empirical 
inquiry into the local relevance of 
epistemological topics as phenomena of 
social order and practical import (Lynch, 
1993). A related motive for the workshop 
was to discuss video-based analysis of 
research activities and its possible 
contribution to such “re-specification.” A 
variety of papers were thus presented, 
ranging from an ethnographic investigation 
into NASA’s Mars expeditions to video 
analysis of pointing gestures by 
agronomists, and fieldwork on dolphin 
classifications by marine biologists.  
 
This special issue, in turn, gathers 
contributions that are explicitly focused on 
discovering work in an 
ethnomethodological perspective, one way 
or other. Some of these contributions were 
presented at the workshop; others were 
solicited subsequently from attending 
parties; still others, such as this 
introduction, were self-initiated.
14
     
 
The contributions to this special issue, in 
particular, deal with the following 
questions:    
 
1) Just how is a [reliable discovery in and 
as school science] achieved? (Sherman 
Heckler) 
2) Just how is the [surgical procedure to 
have a patient’s ureter discovered] 
instructed and engaged in? 
(Koschmann and Zemel) 
3) Just how is a [practical impossibility in 
mathematical reasoning discovered] as 
an instructive expression of its lived 
course (Sharrock and Anderson)? 
4) Just how are [a first local spectroscopy 
on a complex superconductor and the 
                                                          
14
 The workshop program is available at 
http://fns.unifr.ch/situatedpractices/en/. 
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instant appraisal of its unprecedented 
result] jointly achieved? (Sormani) 
5) Just how is the [discovery status of a 
thought-to-be-extinct, yet recently 
filmed woodpecker] established, 
challenged and reexamined? (Lynch) 
6) Just how is a [biological ontology as 
the putative framework for future 
discoveries] routinely elaborated? 
(Sharrock, Randall, and Greiffenhagen) 
7) Just how might the [“pulsar paper” be 
rediscovered as a “citation classic”] in 
ethnomethodology, STS and beyond? 
(Bovet, Carlin, and Sormani) 
 
Readers are invited to read the respective 
studies to have the stated questions 
answered in detail – to have, for instance, 
the intricate work of elaborating a 
[biological ontology as the putative 
framework for future discoveries] 
specified. The formulations in square 
brackets, in each and every case, 
summarize the involved participants’ 
concern (as suggested by Garfinkel and 
Sacks, 1970:352). The key aim of the 
collected studies, then, is to describe “just 
how” this manifest concern is addressed by 
them, respectively – that is, through their 
practical enactment of recognizable, 
variable and yet distinctive courses of 
discovering work.
15
   
 
In what sense, then, do the offered 
descriptions offer a “re-specification” of 
discovery as an epistemological topic and 
social phenomenon? There is no simple 
answer to this question, if only for the 
outlined variety of investigative practices, 
each of which defines “discovering work” 
and “discovery” in its own terms. The 
ambivalent character of 
ethnomethodological inquiry, as 
                                                          
15
 G. Ryle’s (1949) distinction between “activity 
verbs” (such as looking, searching or researching) 
and “achievement verbs” (such as seeing, finding or 
discovering) allows us to raise the question, but not 
to answer it.  
exemplified by this special issue, 
complicates matters further.
16
 
 
Indeed, such inquiry may be understood in 
two ways at least: either as a “beginning” 
or an “ending” (Hutchinson et al., 
2008:109-110).  
 
When understood as a beginning, its 
investigations may be thought of as a “first 
step in the direction of a genuine 
sociological science, one which 
differentiates itself from sociology-at-large 
[…] in being the only branch of sociology 
that addresses itself directly to actual and 
observable occurrences in and of the social 
order” (ibid., p. 109; emphasis added). 
Transcript-assisted video analysis, 
conducted in conversation analytic vein, 
can be seen as the most recent 
representative of this branch. Conversely, 
when understood as an ending, 
ethnomethodological inquiry renders 
superfluous the very “idea of ‘a sociology’ 
as the proprietary possession of a 
profession of investigators” (ibid., p. 110). 
That is to say, the topics and concerns of 
the profession, including the perceptive 
video analyst, are abandoned as topics and 
concerns of the profession alone. Instead, 
they are recovered for how they already 
feature, provided that they do, in “socially 
organized indigenous practice” (ibid.).  
 
Depending upon the “beginning” potential 
or “ending” power attributed to 
ethnomethodological inquiry, the idea of 
“re-specification” should be interpreted 
differently. Whenever its beginning 
potential is explored or exploited, 
ethnomethodological inquiry may satisfy a 
professional sociological demand for 
(more) empirical detail, as possibly 
relevant to a theoretical argument or 
practical concern (e.g., how to improve 
“human-computer interaction”). More 
                                                          
16
 Only when seen from too far away can it be 
dismissed as a defensively “pure” approach.  
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importantly, however, it should allow the 
investigator to specify the “identifying 
details” of the examined practice, those 
details which identify the practice for those 
involved, while proving relevant for and 
attended to, by them, in its actual course. 
Conversely, when the ending power of 
ethnomethodological inquiry with respect 
to professional prerogatives is emphasized, 
then the self-instructive character of any 
examined line of practice should be 
foregrounded. It is through its autodidactic 
exercise and eventual mastery that the 
analyst gains his or her detailed 
understanding of its immanent, yet 
accountable features – be s/he equipped 
with pen and paper, a video camera, a 
prism or any other potentially heuristic 
device (see Livingston, 2008).  
 
Space and time prevents us from 
describing the observable consequences of 
the indicated ambivalences on the actual 
investigation of discovering work. Simply, 
we invite readers of the ensuing studies to 
bear those ambivalences in mind. To do so 
should not only add to the appreciation of 
the particular outlook of each study but 
also contribute to revive discussion “in”, 
“with” and “against” social studies of 
science – the multifaceted concern of this 
special issue.
17
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